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COMMENT
Security and Innocence Under CERCLA:
The Battle Against Confusion
Bruce Taterka

This article analyzes the confusion which has surrounded CERCLA's secured creditor exemption and innocent landowner defense. This confusion is primarily
centered on the phrases "participationin management"
as used in the security interest exemption, and "all appropriate inquiry" as used in the innocent landowner
defense. These phrases are undefined by CERCLA, and
the case law has provided conflicting interpretations.As
a result of this uncertainty, no clear guidelines exist by
which environmentally diligent real estate lenders and
purchasers can insulate themselves from potential CERCLA liability.
The author, however, notes that recent regulatory
and private sector activity marks a trend toward clarifying the defenses. The article reviews proposed legislation
and regulations defining the terms of the defenses, and
discusses the policy implications of the proposed
schemes. It is also noted that industry standardsfor conducting property transfer environmental audits are developing, providing meaning for the phrase "all appropriate inquiry." The article concludes that as the
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statutory defenses are maturing confusion is subsiding,
and that new regulations and the emergence of industry
standards should provide guidelines within which truly
"innocent" lenders and purchasers can operate in the
future without the unreasonablefear of CERCLA.

I.

Introduction

The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)1 was enacted by Congress
in 1980 to provide a regulatory scheme for the cleanup of hazardous waste sites. One of the effects of CERCLA is that it
can place liability for the entire cost of hazardous waste
cleanup on the current owner of a site, regardless of whether
he was responsible for or had any knowledge of the presence
of contamination at the site.2 CERCLA can also place liability
for cleanup on a lender whose borrower's operation has contaminated a site.' Strict CERCLA liability can thus impose
enormous hazardous waste liability on relatively "innocent"
parties. Purchasers risk buying into CERCLA liability when
they acquire a site, and lenders face two sources of potential
liability: 1) by becoming entangled in the management of a
borrower's contaminated facility,' and 2) by foreclosing on
and taking possession of contaminated properties.5
Recognizing the severity of CERCLA liability, Congress
provided two exceptions to apply in certain situations. In the
first exception, lenders may be protected from CERCLA liability if they merely hold a security interest in a property and
do not participate in its management.6 In the second, a defense to CERCLA liability is allowed for landowners who unknowingly purchase contaminated sites, provided they exer1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (1988) [hereinafter CERCLA]. CERCLA was
reauthorized by the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986).
2. See infra note 16.
3. See infra note 31.
4. See infra notes 31-36 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
6. CERCLA § 101(20)(A). See infra note 23 and accompanying text.
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cise due diligence in an effort to discover hazardous
substances prior to purchase. 7 The source of the confusion addressed in this comment lies in the fact that there are no clear
standards, either statutory or regulatory, to guide the actions
of good-faith lenders and purchasers so that they may confidently of avoid CERCLA liability. Additionally, the courts
have exacerbated the confusion surrounding CERCLA by providing inconsistent interpretations of the statutory defenses.
The result of this confusion is that almost all real estate
transactions today have some degree of CERCLA risk
attached.8
The confusion surrounding CERCLA's defenses has generated a fair amount of litigation and enormous criticism. For
the past several years, lawyers, business people, and Congress
have waged a battle against CERCLA confusion by attempting to define the parameters of the statutory defenses through
the development of regulations,9 legislation, 0 and industry
standards.1"
This paper focuses on the battle against the confusion
surrounding the two primary statutory defenses to CERCLA
liability - the section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense,
and the section 101(20)(A) secured creditor exemption. Each
defense is discussed separately. The discussion includes an
overview of the statutory scheme, the varying judicial interpretations of each defense, the proposed legislative amendments, and the policy considerations associated with the varying interpretations of each defense. It is concluded that
although the confusion surrounding CERCLA - the uncertainty of the terms of its statutory defenses - is currently as
high as it has ever been, relief may be at hand.
7. CERCLA §§ 107(b)(3), 101(35). See infra notes 97-98 and accompanying text.
8. Potential CERCLA liability is associated with traditional real estate transactions as well as business transactions in which corporate control of potentially contaminated sites is involved. J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK 96-97 (10th ed. 1989).
9. See infra notes 57-68 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 69-83 and accompanying text.
11. See infra note 131.
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Discussion of the CERCLA Liability Scheme

CERCLA Clean Up Actions

Whenever there is a release 12 or threat of a release of a
hazardous substance's into the environment, the federal government is authorized to arrange for cleanup actions. If a "potentially responsible party" (PRP) 4 is identified and the government determines that the PRP is capable of conducting
the cleanup, the PRP may be allowed to carry out and pay for
the action. 15 Where PRPs are unidentified, incapable or un12. CERCLA § 101(22) states:
The term "release" means any spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting, emptying, discharging, injecting, escaping, leaching, dumping, or disposing into the environment (including the abandonment or discarding of barrels, containers, and other closed receptacles containing any hazardous
substance or pollutant or contaminant), but excludes (A) any release which
results in exposure to persons solely within a workplace, with respect to a
claim which such persons may assert against the employer of such persons,
(B) emission from the engine exhaust of a motor vehicle, rolling stock, aircraft, vessel, or pipeline pumping station engine, (C) release of [nuclear material from a nuclear incident subject to financial requirements of the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission], and (D) the normal application of fertilizer.
13. CERCLA § 101(14) states:
The term "hazardous substance" means (A) any substance designated
pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33 [Clean Water Act], (B) any element, compound, mixture, solution, or substance designated pursuant to section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste having the characteristics
identified under or listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act (but not including any waste the regulation of which under the Solid
Waste Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of Congress), (D) any toxic
pollutant listed under section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean Air Act, and (F) any imminently
hazardous chemical substance or mixture with respect to which the Administrator has taken action pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term does
not include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction thereof which is
not otherwise specifically listed or designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph, and the term does not include natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquefied natural gas, or synthetic gas
usable for fuel (or mixtures of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
14. CERCLA § 107(a) refers to a PRP as a "covered person."
15. CERCLA § 104(a)(1) states:
Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substantial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contaminant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the
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willing to carry out and finance the cleanup actions, the government may conduct the cleanup action using money from
the Superfund. 16 Once the government has expended
Superfund money to clean up a site, any PRPs for that site
are liable to reimburse the Superfund for the entire cost incurred by the government. 7
B.

CERCLA Responsible Parties
Once a PRP is identified, he may be held strictly liable

national contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or
contaminant at any time (including its removal from any contaminated natural resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment. When the President determines that
such action will be done properly and promptly by the owner or operator of
the facility or vessel or by any other responsible party, the President may
allow such person to carry out the action, conduct the remedial investigation,
or conduct the feasibility study in accordance with section 9622 of this title.
16. CERCLA § 104(a). The Superfund is a 1.6-billion dollar fund allocated by
Congress under CERCLA, and replenished with 8.5-billion dollars under SARA, to
finance government response costs at hazardous waste sites. CERCLA § 111(a).
17. CERCLA § 107(a) states:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to
the defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section (1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance
owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who [arranged for disposal, treatment, or transportation
of hazardous substances],
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for
transport to disposal or treatment facilities ... from which there is a release,
or a threatened release which causes the incurrence of response costs, of a
hazardous substance, shall be liable for (A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States
Government ... not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person
consistent with the national contingency plan;
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources,
including the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss
resulting from such a release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out
under section 9604(i) of this title.
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for all costs incurred as a result of the release.' 8 PRPs mainly
include hazardous waste generators,19 transporters, and past
and current "owners and operators" of a facility 20 where there
is a release or threat of release 2 ' of hazardous substances.22
Parties who have been held liable as an "owner and operator"
include owners or operators,2 3 lessors, lessees,2" lenders who
finance contaminated sites,2 5 and unknowing purchasers of
contaminated sites.2 6
Lenders who finance contaminated property may be
found liable under CERCLA in two different ways.27 If the
lender takes title to contaminated property through foreclosure, he may be liable as the current owner of the site.2 8 A
lender may also be held liable for participating in the manage2
ment of a borrower's contaminated facility.
18. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (owner of
a site from which there is a release or threat of release may be held strictly liable
under CERCLA without regard to causation); City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem.
Co., [18 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987)
(held employer strictly liable for intentional illegal acts of an employee under
CERCLA).
19. See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (held that
waste generator defendants must present specific evidence demonstrating that all of
their waste was removed from the site prior to the release of hazardous materials,
thereby establishing that their waste was not associated with the release).
20. CERCLA § 101(9) defines a "facility" broadly. The courts, too, interpret
CERCLA broadly. See Tanglewood East Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849
F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (held that a subdivision built on the site of a defunct woodtreating operation is a "facility" within the meaning of CERCLA § 101(9)).
21. See supra note 12.
22. See supra note 13.
23. See Tanglewood East Homeowners, 849 F.2d 1568 (rejected defendant's argument that liability may be imposed upon only those persons who both own and
operate a polluted property).
24. See infra note 106.
25. See infra notes 32-35 and accompanying text.
26. See infra note 104 and accompanying text.
27. See Roger J. Marzulla & Brett G. Kappel, Lender Liability Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 41 S.C. L.
Ri.

705 (1990).

28. See United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co., 632 F. Supp. 573 (D.
Md. 1986) (defendant lender was held liable under-section 107(a) as a current owner
when it foreclosed on and subsequently purchased and maintained ownership of contaminated property).
29. See infra notes 31-35 and accompanying text..
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In sum, the CERCLA liability scheme allows the federal
government to place the burden for cleanup costs on PRPs
who are essentially "innocent" with respect to the hazardous
substances at a site. The resulting remediation costs may run
into millions of dollars. The remediation activities may include conducting extensive hydrogeological investigations to
characterize the contamination, excavation of the site, disposal or treatment of contaminated soil and groundwater, providing alternate water supplies to those affected by the contamination, conducting health effects studies, and other costs
associated with the hazardous substances."0
III. The Defenses to CERCLA Liability
A.

The Security Interest Exception for Lenders
1. The Statutory Scheme: CERCLA Section 101(20)(A)

Section 101(20)(A)(iii) of CERCLA provides an exception
to the definition of "owner and operator." This exception applies to a lender who, "without participating in the management of a ...

facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to

protect his security interest.""1 The key to this "security in30. CERCLA §§ 104, 107.
31. CERCLA § 101(20) states:
(A) The term "owner or operator" means (i) in the case of a vessel, any
person owning, operating, or chartering by demise, such vessel, (ii) in the case
of an onshore facility or an offshore facility, any person owning or operating
such facility, and (iii) in the case of any facility, title or control of which was
conveyed due to bankruptcy, foreclosure, tax delinquency, abandonment, or
similar means to a unit of State or local government, any person who owned,
operated, or otherwise controlled activities at such facility immediately beforehand. Such term does not include a person, who, without participating in
the management of a vessel or facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily
to protect his security interest in the vessel or facility.
(D) The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or
local government which acquired ownership or control [of a facility] involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delinquency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involuntarily acquires title by virtue of its
function as sovereign. The exclusion provided under this paragraph shall not
apply to any State or local government which has caused or contributed to
the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance from the facility,
and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provisions of this
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terest" exception is the interpretation of the phrase "partici32
pating in the management of a ... facility.
The section 101(20)(A)(iii) security interest exception indicates a congressional intent to provide protection for financial institutions that hold title primarily to secure a loan, as
long as the financial institution does not participate in the
management of the facility.3 3 Unfortunately, neither the statute nor the sparse legislative history of CERCLA provides
meaningful guidance on the degree of management participation required to incur liability.34 No clear standards exist for
establishing whether a lender has participated in the management of a facility.3 5 The lack of standards has created an
acute problem in the banking community, as enormous CERCLA liability may arise from small and apparently benign
properties."6 The problems associated from the lack of standards has been exacerbated by conflicting interpretations by
37
the federal courts of appeal.
2.

The Security Interest Exception As Applied by the
Courts

The initial standard for management participation was
established in United States v. Mirabile.38 The Mirabile court
held that a secured creditor who does not participate in the
chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally and
substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section 9607 [CERCLA § 107] of this title.
32. See Roslyn Tom, Interpreting the Meaning.of Lender Management Participation Under Section 101 (20) (A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925, 926 (1989).
33. CERCLA § 101(20)(A)(iii).
34. The House Report on CERCLA provides no guidance for interpreting the
meaning of the section 101(20)(A) phrase "participating in the management of a facility." See H.R. REP. No. 172, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6160, 6181.
35. See Michele B. Corash & Lawrence Behrendt, Lender Liability Under CERCLA: Search for a Safe Harbor, 43 Sw. L.J. 863, 865 (1990); Tom, supra note 32.
36. Corash & Behrendt, supra note 35, at 865. "[M]any lenders are now reluctant
to make loans to borrowers that face even a small possibility of environmental liability." Id.
37. See infra notes 49-56 and accompanying text.
38. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992, (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985); [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,994 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
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operational, production, or waste disposal activities of a borrower's facility is free from liability if the creditor merely
forecloses on the property after the cessation of hazardous
waste activities.3 9 Mirabile distinguished "nuts-and-bolts involvement" with hazardous substances from mere financial involvement, holding that the security interest exception shields
creditors from liability unless they have participated in the
"operational, production, or waste disposal activities" of the
facility.40 The Mirabile standard was applied, more or less, in
lender liability cases until 1990."
The Mirabile security interest exception was narrowed in
United States v. Maryland Bank and Trust Co."2 In Maryland Bank, the defendant lender foreclosed on and held title
to a contaminated waste site. The EPA subsequently undertook remediation activities at the site. The government then
undertook an enforcement action against the defendant
lender.," The Maryland Bank court held that the security interest exception was not available to a foreclosing lender who
holds title to a facility at the time of a cleanup." A lender in
such a situation has an ownership interest rather than a security interest, and is thus not protected by the secured creditor
exception.' 5 The Maryland Bank court distinguished Mirabile
on the basis that the Mirabile lender promptly (within four
months) assigned the facility to a third party upon foreclosure.' 6 The court warned that a broadened application of the
security interest exception to mortgagees-turned-owners
"would convert CERCLA into an insurance scheme for financial institutions." "[M]aking prudent loans" was the recommended course for lender protection. 7
39. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. .(Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20.993. In Mirabile the secured creditor successfully bid on the property at the foreclosure sale, but subsequently assigned their bid to the Mirabiles. Id.
40. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) at 20,996-97.
41. See infra text accompanying note 49.
42. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
43. Id. at 575-76.
44. Id. at 579.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 579, n.5; see also id. at 580.
47. Id. at 580.
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The Mirabile standard for management participation was
applied by a federal district court in the first of the United
States v. Fleet Factors Corp.4 8 decisions. The district court in
Fleet Factors held that the security interest exception permits
a creditor to provide financial assistance, and even isolated instances of specific management advice, to its debtors without
risking CERCLA liability if the creditor does not participate
in the day-to-day management of the facility."9
Both the Mirabile and Maryland Bank standards were
applied in Guidice v. BFG Electroplatingand Manufacturing
Corp..5 The court in Guidice held that a bank's inspection of
a borrower's contaminated facility and participation in its financial matters did not violate the terms of the security interest exception prior to the bank's foreclosure on and purchase
of the property. 1 Upon foreclosure, however, the bank became liable as a current owner. 2
After several years of relative consistency in which the
courts permitted lenders to take limited action without violating the secured creditor exemption, the scope of the exemption was drastically narrowed by the Eleventh Circuit in the
appeal of the Fleet Factors decision. In the Fleet Factors appeal, 53 the Eleventh Circuit rejected the Mirabile nuts-andbolts standard as too permissive. Instead, it held that a secured creditor may become liable "by participating in the financial management of a facility to a degree indicating a capacity to influence the corporation's treatment of hazardous
wastes. ' 54 This "capacity to influence" test created a much
broader standard for lender management participation than
the Mirabile standard and raised potential lender liability to a
new level. Fleet Factors essentially changed the interpretation
of management participation from one of actual participation
48.
49.
50.
1989).
51.
52.
53.
54.

724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988), rev'd, 901 F.2d 1550 (llth Cir. 1990).
Id. at 960.
[20 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,439 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 1,

Id. at 20,441.
Id. at 20,441-42.
United States v. Fleet Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 1557.
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to one of an ability to participate. To qualify for the security
interest exception under Fleet Factors, lenders must limit
their role to one in which they are incapable of influencing
their borrowers' hazardous substance management practices.
While lenders who do so may be protected from CERCLA liability, they also assume the additional risk of the toxic destruction of their security interest. Such a dilemma was discounted by the Fleet Factors court, which explained that
rather than encouraging lenders to disassociate themselves
from their borrowers' operations, the "capacity to influence"
test "should encourage potential creditors to investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems and policies of potential
debtors."55 The Fleet Factors decision thus endorses an active
role for lenders in policing the environmental integrity of
their borrowers' facilities.
The Eleventh Circuit's "capacity to influence" test was
avoided by the Ninth Circuit in In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.. 6
Bergsoe involved a sale of bonds to finance a lead recycling
facility operated by Bergsoe. Due to financial difficulties,
Bergsoe was forced into bankruptcy by the bank who held the
bonds, and by the issuer of the bonds, the Port of St. Helens,
to whom Bergsoe was indebted. When the bank filed suit
against Bergsoe's owners to collect on its debt, Bergsoe's owners counterclaimed, alleging that the bank and the Port were
liable under CERCLA for the cost of cleaning up lead contamination caused by Bergsoe's operation at the facility. To determine whether the security interest exception applied to the
bank and the Port, the court first carefully considered the
purpose for which the Port held the deed to the Bergsoe property. It found that the Port's purpose was limited to protecting a security interest. The second step in the court's analysis
was to determine whether the bank and the Port participated
in the management of the facility. The court considered the
rule articulated by the Eleventh Circuit in Fleet Factors, but
avoided endorsing the Fleet Factors "capacity to influence"
standard.
55. Id. at 1558.
56. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
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In Bergsoe, the court claimed to avoid ruling on a management participation standard, preferring to "leave for another day" the opportunity to establish such a rule.5 7 The
court reasoned that under any interpretation of CERCLA's
management participation doctrine "there must be some actual management of the facility before a secured creditor will
fall outside the exception. Here there was none, and we therefore need not engage in line drawing. "58 Although the Ninth
Circuit claimed to avoid articulating a rule which would conflict with the Eleventh Circuit's Fleet Factors decision, the
Ninth Circuit's standard of actual participation can be interpreted to be at odds with the Eleventh Circuit's "capacity to
influence" standard.
The United States Supreme Court, at the urging of the
federal government, has declined to settle the differences
among the Circuit Courts of Appeals." The Supreme Court
decided not to consider an appeal of the Eleventh Circuit's
Fleet Factors decision, 0 in which it could have articulated a
management participation standard.
3.

The EPA's Proposed Interpretive
. Lender Liability Issues

Rule Defining

In an effort to clarify the permissible level of lender management participation under the secured creditor exemption,
the EPA has issued a proposed rule to limit liability of financial institutions under CERCLA. 1 Recognizing that the Elev57. Id. at 672.
58. Id.
59. Lender Liability Under Superfund Law Will Not Be Reviewed By Supreme
Court, [21 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1675 (Jan. 18, 1991).
60. Id. Review was denied because of the interlocutory nature of the appeal. The
case will return to the federal district court to determine the degree of the defendant's management participation at the facility. Id.
61. EPA Proposal to Limit Liability of Financial Institutions Under CERCLA
(Signed June 5, 1991), [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 430 (June 14,
1991). The proposed rule would be codified as a revision to the National Contingency
Plan, 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1 - 300.86 (1991). This proposal was issued twice in draft form.
See Proposed Draft Rule on Lender Liability Under CERCLA (Jan. 24, 1991), [21
Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1908 (Feb. 22, 1991); EPA Draft Proposal
Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor Exemption of CER-
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enth Circuit's Fleet Factors "capacity to influence" standard
heightened lender uncertainties, the EPA's proposed rule
specifies the type of actions which may be taken by lenders
while remaining within the bounds of the exemption.
Under the proposed rule, the section 101(20)(A) phrases
"indicia of ownership" and "primarily to protect a security interest" would serve to limit the exemption to true security interests.2 The proposed rule would allow a foreclosing creditor
to take possession of a secured property without triggering
CERCLA liability, provided that the creditor acts solely to
protect a security interest.63 New or continuing releases of
hazardous substances would not trigger section 107 strict liability unless a plaintiff could prove that the defendant is an
"owner or operator."64
'
The proposed rule defines the section 101(20)(A) phrase
"participation in the management of a facility," which has
been the main source of uncertainty following the Bergsoe
CLA (Sept. 14, 1990), [21 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162 (Oct. 12,
1990) [hereinafter EPA Draft Proposal].
62. The proposed rule states that the security interest exception is limited to a
"legally recognized security interest, and not an interest in property held for some
other reason," such as for investment purposes. [22 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) at 435. The distinction between "interests in the nature of an investment" and "security interests" may, in some circumstances, be a difficult one, especially where property held by a lender serves dual purposes of securing a debt and
producing revenue. See id. The "facts of each case" determine whether a transaction
creates a security interest within the section 101(20)(A) exemption. Id. at 442 n.4.
63. Id. at 438. In order-to demonstrate that a foreclosed-on property is held to
protect a security interest, the creditor must at least advertise the property for sale
within twelve months of foreclosure, and not reject a written offer of fair consideration at any time after six months after foreclosure.
This issue has raised concern among federal agencies, particularly the Department of Housing and Urban Development, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Small Business Association. Property Held For More Than Six Months
Not Investment, Agencies Say on Lender Liability, [21 Current Developments] Env't
Rep. (BNA) 1733 (Feb. 1, 1991). These agencies and others may be under a statutory
duty to maximize financial recovery on defaulted loans, which could require holding
foreclosed properties for more than six months. Id. However, the proposed rule reiterates CERCLA's exception from the definition of "owner and operator" for government entities who involuntarily acquire contaminated property. [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 442 n.14. See also supra note 31.
64. [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 434.
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Metals and Fleet Factors" decisions. The proposed rule
states:
Participation in the management of a facility means, for
the purpose of Section 101(20)(A), actual participation in
the management or operational affairs by the holder of
the security interest, and does not include the mere capacity, or ability to influence, or the unexercised right to
control facility operations.6 7
A security holder would be considered to be participating in
management if it exercised decision making or managementlevel control over its borrowers' environmental compliance to
such a degree that it undertakes responsibility for hazardous
substance management practices.6 8 A lender would not be
considered to be participating in management by inspecting
the secured property or even requiring the borrower to clean
up hazardous substances during the term of the security interest. 8 Loan work out activities would not be considered to be
participating in management, if structured to "protect and
preserve the security interest in an effort to prevent default of
the obligation or the diminution in value of the security. ' 70
Owner and operator liability will attach, however, when a secured creditor's actions cause a release or threatened release
of hazardous substances, thereby creating an independent basis for liability under CERCLA section 107(a)."
By requiring a standard of actual management participation, rather than the mere ability to participate, the proposed
rule endorses the Ninth Circuit Bergsoe Metal position and
rejects the Eleventh Circuit "capacity to influence" standard
as articulated in Fleet Factors.
The promulgation of the EPA rule would be a significant
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
[22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) at 441.
Id.
Id.

Id.
See id. at 437.
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step in reducing secured creditor confusion. Not only would
the proposed rule serve as a basis for limiting the circumstances in which the government would be inclined to bring a
CERCLA action against a secured creditor," it would also
provide definitions and guidelines for courts to apply in thirdparty CERCLA cost recovery actions against lenders.73
4.

Proposed Legislation to Amend and Expand the Security Interest Exception

In addition to the regulations being developed by the
EPA, the battle against secured creditor confusion is also being fought in Congress. In 1989, two House bills were introduced by Congressman LaFalce. 4 These bills sought to include commercial lending institutions, who acquire
"ownership or control" of a contaminated property in order to
protect a security interest, within the section 101(20)(D) exception for governmental entities who involuntarily acquire
contaminated properties through sovereign action.75 A bill

with a similar effect was introduced by Senator Garn in
1990.76' Had any version of these bills been enacted, the protection afforded to governmental entities by section
72. See Lender Liability Issues Attract Attention at Annual American Bar Association Meeting, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1148, 1149 (Aug.
23, 1991).
73. Id. at 1148-49.
74. H.R. 2085, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. E 1325 (1989); H.R. 4494,
101st Cong., 2d Sess., 136 CONG. REC. E 1023 (1989).
75. See supra note 31.
76. Senator Garn proposed S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), an amendment
to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 1811-1832 (1988), to provide that:
No insured depository institution or mortgage lender shall be liable under
any law imposing strict liability for the release, threatened release, storage or
disposal of a hazardous substance or similar material from property (1) acquired through foreclosure;
(2) held in a fiduciary capacity; or
(3) held, controlled or managed pursuant to the terms of an extension of

credit.
This exemption would not apply to any person who (1) caused the release, (2)
failed to take reasonable precautions to prevent the release, or (3) benefitted from a
government response action.
S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1102 (1990).
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101(20)(D) would have been broadened to protect private interests. Liability would not attach to lenders participating in
management to such a degree amounting to "control" if such
control was exercised for the purpose of protecting a security
interest. Neither would owner liability attach upon
foreclosure. 7
Such restructuring of the CERCLA liability scheme
would significantly shift the burden for hazardous waste site
clean up costs from the private to the public sector. Section
101(20)(D), as it stands, protects government entities from
CERCLA liability where they involuntarily acquire title
through sovereign action, 78 thus allowing the cleanup of publicly owned contaminated sites to be financed by the
Superfund 9 If government entities were not protected by section 101(20)(D) and had to expend their own funds for hazardous waste clean up, the Superfund would be strengthened
while the unfortunate government entities suffered. This
would merely amount to a redistribution of government funds.
However, the proposed broadening of section 101(20)(D) to
include mortgage lenders would benefit private entities at the
expense of the Superfund. Such a policy conflicts with Congress' intention to hold private parties strictly liable for the
costs of cleanup, particularly those who directly or indirectly
benefit from the release of hazardous substances. 8 0 The proposed legislation would amount to a bailout for lenders who
finance contaminated sites.
A more sound policy would be to develop definitive standards for CERCLA lender liability over institutions which
commit loan funds and exercise management control of secured properties.8 1 More recently proposed legislation em77. S. 2827, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. § 1102 (1990).
78. See supra note 31.
79. See supra note 15.
80. See Roger J. Marzulla, Keynote Address, [18 News & Analysis] Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,350 (Sept. 1988). "Congress has made the choice in CERCLA
•.. that the responsibility for cleaning up hazardous waste across this nation ought to
rest upon those who in one way or another profited from, or otherwise helped to
create, those sites." Id. at 10,351.
81. Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 27, at 732.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss1/6

16

1991]

CERCLA

braces this approach, focusing on providing definitions and
standards rather than blanket protection for lenders. In 1991,
Congressman Owens proposed the "Superfund Liability Clarification Act," which defines management participation consistently with the EPA's proposed rule. 2 A bill introduced in
1991 by Congressman LaFalce provides similar clarification of
the secured creditor exemption.8 3 Both of these bills clarify
the scope of the exemption while leaving CERCLA's basic policy intact. Creditors are permitted to take environmentally responsible action to protect their security interest without incurring CERCLA liability. Under the Owens bill, a lender
causing or contributing to a release of hazardous substances is
strictly liable under CERCLA section 107(a),84 while under
the LaFalce bill the liability of such a lender is limited to the
85
costs attributable to his actions.
82. H.R. 1643, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). Under H.R. 1643:
participation in the management of a vessel or facility does not include (I) selling collateral;
(II) actions taken by a mortgage lender [to conduct environmental investigations into a borrower's facility consistent with guidelines imposed pursuant
to H.R. 1643];
(III) actions taken by a mortgage lender.., upon learning of any contamination so as not to cause a release... or [to] wind down the affairs of the owner
...or while diligently proceeding to pass title of the vessel or facility;
(IV) the status of having the capacity or ability to affect hazardous waste
disposal management decisions of the vessel or facility; or
(V) engaging in so-called 'work-out' activities ....
Id. § 2.
83. H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991). This bill defines the term "participating in the management" as "actual, direct, and continual or recurrent exercise of
managerial control by a person over the vessel or facility in which he or she holds a
security interest, which managerial control materially divests the borrower ... of such
control." Id. § 1.
84. "Nothing in this subparagraph shall affect the liability .. of a person who,
by any act or omission, causes or contributes to a release .
H.R. 1643, 102d
Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
85. H.R. 1450, 102d Cong., 1st Sess, § 1 (1991). "A person who . . . causes or
exacerbates a release or threatened release . . . shall be liable for the cost of such
response, to the extent that the release or threatened release is attributable to the
person's activities." Id. § 1. Congressman LaFalce maintains that this provision would
create a "carrot and stick" situation for creditors. By imposing liability based on
fault, secured creditors would be encouraged to take environmentally responsible action without becoming exposed to the full force of strict CERCLA liability. See 137
CONG. REC. H1769, H1770 (daily ed. Mar. 14, 1991)(statement of Rep. LaFalce).
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Senator Garn introduced the most pro-banking bill of the
102d Congress, the "Federal Deposit Insurance Improvements
Act of 1991." ' 8" The Garn bill would limit hazardous waste liability on "insured depository institutions" and "mortgage
lenders" to the "actual benefit conferred" on the lender by
the cleanup, provided the lender has not actively directed or
conducted the operation resulting in the release. 7 In addition,
the bill rejects Fleet Factors by prohibiting hazardous substance liability "based solely on . . .the unexercised capacity
to influence" operations.8 8
5.

Policy Considerations

In order to clarify the current standard of lender liability,
Congress must reconcile two conflicting views on how to promote environmentally responsible action by lending institutions. One view promotes an active role for the commercial
lending industry in investigating and policing, the environmental liability of its borrowers. Under this view lending institutions would not subject themselves to CERCLA liability
by influencing the owners of properties to take environmentally corrective action.8 9 Congress implicitly endorsed this
view in CERCLA section 101(20)(d), added by SARA in 1986,
by expressly providing a broad exception from liability for
governmental entities but left unchanged the security interest
exception for lenders."0 Under the other view, subjecting lending institutions to broad CERCLA liability would encourage
increased foresight and supervision. 1
86. S. 651, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
87. Id. § 152(a). The bill also provides protection from costly CERLCA cleanup
actions by stating that "actual benefit conferred ... shall not exceed the fair market
value of the property following such action." Id. § 152(b).
88. Id. § 152(a)(3).
89. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
90. See supra note 31; Alan P. Vollmann, Double Jeopardy: Lender Liability
Under Superfund, 16 REAL EST. L.J. 3, 11 (1987).
91. Critics of lender liability reform argue that the redefinition of management
participation as proposed by the EPA rule and the LaFalce and Garn bills would
"remove an effective enforcement tool and reduce environmental vigilance of lenders." EPA Official Disputes Need Under CERCLA for Amendment Offering Protection to Lenders, [21 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 2252 (Apr. 19, 1991).
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Holding lenders liable for their borrower's toxic releases
requires the commercial lending industry to employ environmental safeguards prior to and after financing a transaction. 2
Prudent lenders will both thoroughly investigate a site prior
to the financing of a transaction9" and closely monitor their
debtors' hazardous waste management practices during the
life of the security interest. 4
The policy of holding lenders strictly liable for minimal
management participation is countered by three arguments.
First, such requirements make it difficult for borrowers to secure loans.9 5 Lenders must effectively "self-insure" their operations, resulting in heightened caution in committing loan
funds and higher interest rates.9 Congress has recognized that
State attorneys general have also asserted that such provisions would weaken state
efforts to clean up hazardous substance sites. See id. at 2253; see also Amy T. Phillips, EPA's Lender Liability Rule: A Sweetheart Deal For Bankers?, [22 Current Developments] Env't Rep. (BNA) 1158 (Aug. 23, 1991).
92. See Paul A. Dominick & Leon C. Harmon, Lender Limbo: The Perils of Environmental Lender Liability, 41 S.C. L. REv. 855 (1990). "In order to minimize exposure to environmental liability, lenders should develop an environmental risk and liability policy." Id. at 870.
93. The Fleet Factors court stated that setting the management participation
standard at the "capacity to influence" level "should encourage potential creditors to
investigate thoroughly the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors." 901 F.2d at 1558. Thorough investigation is thus the pre-acquisition safeguard
required under Fleet Factors.
94. The Fleet Factors' court stated, "[slimilarly, creditors' awareness that they
are potentially liable under CERCLA will encourage them to monitor the hazardous
waste treatment systems and policies of their debtors and insist upon compliance
with acceptable treatment standards as a prerequisite to continued and future finan-

cial support." Id. Creditors are especially well situated to investigate the hazardous
waste treatment policies of their debtors. Risk will be weighed into loan agreements,
thus creating financial incentives for good hazardous waste management practices by
borrowers. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1558, n.12. Commentators have reasoned that
the driving force behind CERCLA is to clean up hazardous waste sites; therefore,
hazardous waste liability should be treated as a necessary cost of doing business and
less debate should be devoted to the protection of "innocent landowner[s]." See
Roger D. Schwenke, Environmental Liabilities Imposed on Landowner, Tenants,
and Lenders - How Far Can and Should They Extend?, [18 News & Analysis] Envtl.

L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,361, 10,362 (Sept. 1988).
95. "The spectre of lender liability under CERCLA threatens to stop lenders
from making loans with any component of environmental risk." Corash & Behrendt,
supra note 35, at 885.
96. See Laurie J. Hammers & T. Patton Youngblood, Comment, The Battle
Continues: Lenders are Still Searching for Well-Defined Methods to Avoid Hazard-
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strict CERCLA liability and the judiciary's narrow view of the
statutory defenses have created a "credit crunch" for farmers,
small businesses, contractors, and manufacturers. 7
Second, it may be impractical for the lending industry to
shoulder such a large burden in enforcing safe environmental
practices. If lenders decide to retain even minimal influence
over their borrower's operations, they may expose themselves
to strict liability as facility operators.0 8 Therefore, lenders who
chose to retain any degree of control will be forced to exert
complete control, effectively serving as environmental policemen with respect to their borrowers' facilities.9 9 This may not
be an efficient or practical means of insuring environmental
compliance. The third reason is a corollary to the second reason. If lenders decide that they do not want to risk incurring
liability as facility operators, they will be forced to relinquish
all capability of management participation. These lenders will
distance themselves from their borrower's hazardous waste
management programs and abandon, rather than assume control of, contaminated properties. 100
ous Waste Cleanup Liability, 19 STETSON L. REV. 633, 657 (1990).
97. 136 CONG. REC. S10,115 (daily ed. July 19, 1990) (statement of Sen.
D'Amato); see 136 CONG. REC. E1023 (daily ed. Apr. 4, 1990) (statement of Rep.
LaFalce) (there is "a disturbing trend in hazardous waste liability law which is
threatening the ability of thousands of small businesses to obtain the financing they
need to survive").
98. See supra note 53 and accompanying text.
99. See Dominick & Harmon, supra note 92, at 870. Lenders must scrutinize
borrowers' past records and potential liability with respect to environmental
problems and carefully evaluate the environmental condition of the property serving
as loan security. Id.
100. See Marzulla & Kappel, supra note 27, at 723 (lenders should "minimize
participation in the borrower's business or ownership of the property . .. [U]pon
default, the lender should carefully weigh the risks [involved] in [a] foreclosure.");
Tom, supra note 32, at 928 ("[a] narrow interpretation of the phrase 'participating in
the management' . . . could encourage banks to monitor waste sites ... [and] engage
in workouts to recover loans . . . thus [enhancing the likelihood] that small waste
problems do not increase ....");Comment, The Liability of FinancialInstitutions
for Hazardous Waste Cleanup Costs Under CERCLA, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 139, 180
("the very lenders who could conceivably encourage borrowers to engage in safer
waste handling and disposal practices also could be dissuaded from offering hazardous waste disposal advice for fear of later being held liable for cleanup costs").
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B. The Innocent Landowner Defense
Unlike the section 101(20)(A) exemption, which is only
available to creditors, the section 107(B)(3) innocent landowner defense is available to any PRP facing liability as a facility owner, provided that the statutory requirements are
met. In enacting section 107(b)(3), Congress intended to protect parties who exercised due care in the purchase of property, and were nonetheless ignorant that the property was
contaminated.' ' The defense also can be used by lenders who
have foreclosed on contaminated facilities and are otherwise
liable as facility owners under section 107(a).' 2
1. The Statutory Scheme: CERCLA Section 107(b)(3)
Once a PRP has been identified under section 107(a),
there are three defenses available under section 107(b). The
section 107(b) defenses are: (1) an act of God; (2) an act of
war; and (3) the "innocent landowner" defense. To qualify for
the "innocent landowner" defense, the owner of a contaminated site must prove that the contamination was caused by a
third party "in connection with a contractual relationship,"
and that the owner 03exercised "due care" with respect to hazardous substances.'

101. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986).
102. The section 107(b)(3) defense may be asserted by a lender in addition to the
section 101(20)(A) secured creditor exemption. The EPA Draft Proposal states: "[in
the limited circumstances in which the secured lender is not in a position to claim the
security interest exemption for property which it owns, the lender/owner may seek to
defend itself as an innocent landowner in the same manner." See supra note 61, at
1166.
103. CERCLA § 107(b) states:
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person otherwise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence
that the release or threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom were caused solely by (1) an act of God;
(2) an act of war;
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent
of the defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection
with a contractual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the
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As CERCLA was originally enacted in 1980, the terms
''contractual relationship" and "due care" were not defined.
As a result, it was unclear whether "due care" required a purchaser of a contaminated site to exercise due care prior to acquisition in order to avoid acquiring a contaminated site,
whether it merely required that a purchaser exercise due care
with respect to hazardous waste after acquisition of the site,
or both.
The requirement that the third party action did not occur
"in connection with a contractual relationship" with the defendant was even more confusing. It was unclear whether
deeds or other forms of conveyance established a "contractual
relationship" for section 107(b)(3) purposes. Furthermore, assuming that a deed establishes a "contractual relationship,"
defendants could argue that the action which caused the release did not occur in connection with the contractual relationship. To clarify the duties of a prospective purchaser,
Congress defined the term "contractual relationship" in
SARA. Section 101(35)(A), added in SARA, provides that a
"contractual relationship" is established by deeds and other
instruments transferring title, unless the owner was not responsible for the contamination of the site and, prior to
purchasing the site, exercised due diligence in investigating
the potential presence of hazardous substances.10
defendant establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous substance concerned, taking into
consideration the characteristics of such hazardous substance, in light of all
relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the consequences that
could foreseeably result from such acts or omission; or
(4) any combination of the foregoing paragraphs.
104. CERCLA § 101(35) states:
(A) The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of [§107(b)(3)]
of this title, includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other
instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which
the facility concerned is located and was acquired by the defendant after the
disposal or placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility,
and one or more of the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is
also established by the defendant by a preponderance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant
did not know and had no reason to know that any hazardous sub-
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The effect of the definition of "contractual relationship"
is that the section 107(b)(3) defense now turns on whether a
purchaser has conducted an "appropriate inquiry" prior to acquisition. If the findings of the inquiry give the purchaser no
knowledge or reason to know of any release or threatened release of a hazardous substance, then the purchaser has no
constructive knowledge of the presence of contamination and
is deemed to have no "contractual relationship" with the previous ownership.
Unfortunately, the "appropriate inquiry" standard provides no indication as to what methods, if any, should be used
to detect hidden contamination prior to a transaction. No definitive regulations or guidelines exist for determining whether
an "innocent" owner of a contaminated site has satisfied the
pre-purchase "appropriate inquiry" requirement.10 5 Thus, a
purchaser of real estate has no certain method of protecting
stance which is the subject of the release or threatened release was
disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the
facility by escheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the exercise of eminent domain authority by
purchase or condemnation.
(iii) The defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or
bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that
he has satisfied the requirements of [§ 107(b)(3)(a) and (b)] of this title.
(B) to establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided
in clause (i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have
undertaken, at the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and uses of the property consistent with good commercial or
customary practice in an effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall take into account any specialized knowledge
or experience on the part of the defendant, the relationship of the purchase
price to the value of the property if uncontaminated, commonly known or
reasonably ascertainable information about the property, the obviousness of
the presence or likely presence of contamination at the property, and the
ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
105. The EPA has endorsed a subjective standard for evaluating "all appropriate
inquiry." Guidance on Landowner Liability Under Section 107(a)(1) of CERCLA,
DeMinimus Settlements Under Section 122(g)(1)(B) of CERCLA, and Settlements
with Prospective Purchasers of Contaminated Property, 54 Fed. Reg. 34,235 (1989). A
"determination as to what constitutes 'all appropriate inquiry' under all the circumstances is to be made on a case by case basis ....
In sum, the determination will be
made on the basis of what is reasonable under all of the circumstances." Id. at 34,238.
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himself from potential CERCLA liability."'
2.

The Innocent Landowner Defense As Applied by the
Courts

This section discusses the existing section 107(b)(3) case
law, in which defendants have rarely succeeded. As is the case
with lender liability, judicial interpretation of the terms of the
defense has been inconsistent, making it difficult to identify a
clear rule. 107
In situations where a purchaser acquires a previously contaminated site, the defense is not available if the release of
hazardous substances continues after the new owner takes title.1 08 The defense is most often denied on the basis of the
purchaser's knowledge, prior to purchase, of the potential
presence of hazardous waste at the site. If the purchaser or his
hired consultants possess or should possess a suspicion that
hazardous materials are present, the defense may be denied. 10 9
Even where a purchaser's consultants and engineers inspect a
facility prior to purchase and report that it is free of hazard106. Innocent landowners are "more than anxious to act in good faith and follow
the rules. They just do not know what the rules are any longer." 137 CONG. REC.
E1129, E1130 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1991) (statement of Rep. Owens).
107. G. Van Velsor Wolf Jr., Emerging Contours of the CERCLA "Innocent Purchaser" Defense, [20 News & Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,483 (Nov.
1990).
108. See New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir. 1985) (held
that where a current owner of a site had knowledge of a past operator's hazardous
waste activities and failed to take precautions against the operator's foreseeable acts,
the section 107(b)(3) defense was precluded).
109. See Jersey City Redevelopment Auth. v. PPG Indus., 655 F. Supp. 1257
(D.N.J. 1987) (where evidence indicated that defendant site owner had knowledge
that soil at his site was contaminated, and then sold the soil to plaintiff with the
knowledge that plaintiff intended to use the soil as fill, the section 107(b)(3) defense
was unavailable even though defendant was not responsible for the presence of the
contamination in the soil. PPG eventually agreed to pay $83.4 million under a New
Jersey Consent decree); Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., [19 Litigation] Envtl.
L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,855 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 23, 1988) (even where a purchaser of a
contaminated site had been misled by the former owners or was genuinely unaware of
the potential for contamination, where the purchaser's hired consultants and counsel
possess information on the presence of hazardous substances at the site and the purchaser somehow fails to obtain such information, the section 107(b)(3) defense is
unavailable).
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ous waste, the purchaser may not be protected. A 1988 case,
BCW Assoc. Ltd. v. Occidental Chemical Corp.,"' denied the
defense although the defendant owner and lessor hired an environmental consulting firm and an engineering firm to inspect a warehouse prior to purchase. In BCW Assoc., the court
held that the defense was unavailable because: 1) the defendants had knowledge of the presence of dust in the warehouse,
although at the time they did not know it was actually hazardous lead dust; 2) it was defendants' activities in the warehouse after they took possession that caused the release of the
dust from the rafters; and 3) the defendants purchased the
warehouse "as is" and received substantial benefit from its
cleanup."
The defense is not available to an owner of a contaminated site where the contamination was caused by a lessee,
because a "contractual relationship" exists between the parties. ' 12 Similarly, the owner of a site may not assert the defense on the basis that the contamination was caused by an
illegal act of an employee, regardless of whether the act was
within the scope of employment. 1 3 The defense is generally
not available to previous owners and operators of contaminated sites, or to hazardous waste generator defendants, regardless of who is responsible for the release of the waste or
how long after waste generation the release occurs." 4 Courts
110. 3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 943 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 30, 1988), available in LEXIS,
Envitl. Library.
111. Id.
112. See Washington v. Time Oil Co., 687 F. Supp. 529 (W.D. Wash. 1988) (the
government's summary judgment motion was granted, denying defendant-lessor's defense that his lessee was responsible for contaminating the site).
113. See City of Philadelphia v. Stepan Chem. Co., [18 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep.
(Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,133 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 1987) (although the contamination was
caused solely by the illegal acts of employees, who accepted bribes to allow hazardous
waste dumping at a city landfill, the court held that the employment contract established a "contractual relationship" and that the CERCLA defense did not incorporate
the common law principle that employers are only liable for the acts of their employees within the scope of employment); United States v. Ward, 618 F. Supp. 884
(E.D.N.C. 1985) (the defense was unavailable where a facility owner paid a third
party to dispose of the owner's PCB-contaminated oil).
114. See United States v. Hooker Chem. and Plastics Corp., 680 F. Supp. 546
(W.D.N.Y. 1988) (held that even if Hooker's predecessor had merely disposed of the
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strictly construe the section 107(b) requirement that the release be caused solely by the act of a third party with whom
the defendant had no contractual relationship. 1 ' 5 In some circumstances, defendants have survived the government's motion for summary judgment. In United States v. Mirabile, the
court applied a pre-SARA standard in denying the government's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the section 107(b)(3) defense.1 16 The court held that the defendants
could avail themselves of the section 107(b)(3) defense if they
"could establish that [they] purchased property on which hazardous wastes were placed by others and that [they] did not
add to those wastes[,] exercised due care with respect to the
wastes[, and] took precautions against foreseeable acts or
omissions of others."'1 7 The defense was not defeated for summary judgement purposes merely because several hundred
leaking and decomposing drums were visible on the site at the
waste and that the release and migration of the waste were solely caused by a third
party with no contractual relationship, Hooker would be jointly and severally liable
for any and all harm caused by the combination of events); United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160 (4th Cir. 1988) (held that waste generator defendants must
present specific evidence demonstrating that all of their waste was removed from the
site prior to the release of hazardous materials, thereby establishing that their waste
was not associated with the release). But see Westwood Pharmaceuticals v. National
Fuel Gas Distrib., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (defendant property seller survived a motion for summary judgment on the issue of whether it was entitled to assert the innocent landowner defense because there was a factual question as to
whether a third party caused the release of hazardous substances placed in the
ground by the defendant. The court distinguished Hooker on the ground "that not
every contractual relationship precludes a former owner from invoking section
107(b)(3) and the [defendant was] entitled to present proof that [the] construction
activities at the site were not undertaken 'in connection with' its contractual relationship"). Id. at 1286.
115. See United States v.Western Processing Co., 734 F. Supp. 930 (W.D. Wash.
1990) (third-party defense fails where the government has proved that at least some
of defendant's arsenic contamination is at the site and defendant merely offers speculative and uncertain proof that arsenic contamination is attributable to other parties);
Kelley v. Thomas Solvent Co., 727 F. Supp. 1532 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (the section
107(b)(3) defense is not available where defendants have failed to argue that a third
party was the sole cause of the release).
116. [15 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4,
1985).
117. Id. at 20,994.
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time of purchase. " 8
Similarly, in United States v. Serafini,"9 the government's motion for summary judgment on the issue of the defense was denied due to the government's failure to present
specific evidence showing that defendant Serafini had "specialized knowledge" or "reason to know" of the presence of
hazardous substances at the site.1 20 The court was not persuaded by the government's showing that over 1,000 fifty-fivegallon drums were visible at the time of purchase, 2 ' holding
that a failure to inspect the site is not necessarily inconsistent
with the section 101(35)(B) requirement of all appropriate in2
quiry consistent with good commercial practice.1
In International Clinical Lab. v. Stevens, 23 the court
suggested that a purchaser of a contaminated site was protected by the section 107(b)(3) defense even though the purchaser failed to inquire into public records which would have
alerted him to the presence of contamination. In Stevens, the
contaminated site was placed on the New York State Department of Environmental Conservation Inactive Hazardous
Waste Disposal Site list prior to purchase by the plaintiff. Although no environmental problems were visible at the time of
sale, the purchaser had apparently not inquired into public
records which would have confirmed that metals and solvents
had been disposed of in cesspools and existed in high concentrations on the site. The court concluded that the previous
owner and lessee were not entitled to contribution from the
purchaser for response costs. 2" In dicta, the court stated that
the purchaser had satisfied the requirements of CERCLA sections 107(b)(3) and 101(35)(A). 12 5 Although the Stevens court
did not provide its reasoning, its conclusion suggests that a
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
1990).
124.
125.

Id.
706 F. Supp. 346 (M.D. Pa. 1988).
Id. at 352.
Id. at 348.
Id. at 352.
[20 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,560 (E.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
Id. at 20,561.
Id.
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failure to discover important public information is not necessarily inconsistent with good commercial practice for conducting appropriate inquiries.
As of this writing, a party has succeeded with the defense
in only one case. In United States v. Pacific Hide and Fur
Depot, Inc.,12 a the court granted summary judgment for the
defendants, where the hazardous waste was disposed of prior
to the initial transfer of title, and there was no evidence to
show that a release occurred while any of the defendants
owned the site. Defendants' success was largely based on the
fact that the transactions at issue were in the nature of inheritance or bequest, and were not part of a commercial
transaction.1 27
The courts have applied varying standards when weighing
a particular purchaser's pre-purchase inquiry. In Serafini, the
defendant survived summary judgment although he failed to
conduct any inquiry at all. In Stevens, the court would have
allowed the defense even though the fact that the site was
contaminated was a matter of public record. However, in
BCW Assoc., a pre-purchase inspection of a facility by a consultant and engineer did not satisfy the "all appropriate inquiry" requirement. The uncertain disposition reflected in the
case law is a result of two factors: 1) the lack of a definitive,
widely recognized standard for pre-purchase investigations,
requiring courts to determine investigation standards on a
case-by-case basis; 2 ' and 2) the inherent conflict in providing
a "due diligence" defense in a strict liability statute. The innocent landowner defense involves a negligence standard. If
the purchaser fails to perform his statutory duty to investigate, then he can not escape strict CERCLA liability. When
126. [19 Litigation] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,897 (D. Idaho Mar. 13,
1989).
127. Id. at 20,900. The legislative history of SARA indicates that Congress intended to impose a three-tier system of strictness on the duty to investigate prior to a
transaction: 1) commercial transactions are held to the strictest standard; 2) private
transactions are given more leniency; and 3) transfers by inheritance or bequest are
treated the most leniently. H.R. CON. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187-88
(1986).
128. See infra note 140.
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applying such standards, courts inevitably weigh equitable
factors into their decisions, such as the financial positions of
the parties to the transaction, the burden or benefit realized
from the cleanup, and the relative culpability of the parties. 12
As a result, there is no consistently applied rule to which purchasers may adhere to protect themselves from liability.
3.

What Constitutes "All Appropriate Inquiry?"

As the existing case law shows, a wide variety of actions
and relationships will preclude the section 107(b)(3) defense,
resulting in a very narrow range of circumstances in which it
is available. An "innocent landowner" defendant is required
to exercise due care, to protect against the foreseeable acts
and omissions of third parties, and to establish that he had no
"contractual relationship" with the third party causing the release by showing that he conducted "all appropriate inquiry"
into the previous ownership. 30 A prospective purchaser must
carefully consider the findings of the inquiry in deciding
whether- to inquire further or to proceed with the
transaction.' 3 '
The intent of SARA's amendment of the provisions of the
"innocent landowner" defense was to exclude from liability
good-faith purchasers of contaminated sites. 1 32 Unfortunately,
in solving one problem, Congress created another. Although
there is now a clear duty upon prospective purchasers to conduct "all appropriate inquiry" prior to acquisition, there is little official guidance as to what level of inquiry is required be33
yond the five general factors provided in section 101(35)(B).1
129. See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
130. See supra notes 97-98.
131. See supra note 103.
132. The SARA conference committee report states that the "definition of contractual relationship is intended to clarify and confirm that under limited circumstances landowners who acquire property without knowing of any contamination at
the site and without reason to know of any contamination ... may have a defense to
liability." H.R. CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 186 (1986).
133. The five factors enumerated in CERCLA § 101(35)(B) are:
1. any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the defendant;
2. the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if
uncontaminated;
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The statutory terms should serve to preclude the section
107(b)(3) defense in cases where a purchaser acquires an obviously contaminated property, although the Serafini decision
suggests otherwise.1 3 4 However, there is little guidance as to
how much diligence, if any, is required to detect hidden contamination such as abandoned landfills, underground storage
tanks, subsurface contamination from past dumping, or the
subsurface migration of contaminants from adjacent areas, all
of which are sufficient to trigger CERCLA liability. So far, the
courts have avoided articulating a standard which would clarify the duties of a purchaser under the "appropriate inquiry"
standard.
The general nature of both the statutory language and
the legislative history supports the view that the adequacy of
an inquiry with negative findings must be judged on a caseby-case basis. 1 5 In cases where a purchaser is genuinely "innocent," that is, where he has exercised due care, took reasonable steps toward an "appropriate inquiry," and can show
that the release was caused by an unrelated third party (i.e.,
where the equitable factors are in his favor), his success with
the defense will depend heavily on the court's evaluation of
the standards for conducting "all appropriate inquiry."
By requiring that the "appropriate inquiry" be consistent
with "good commercial practice,""1 Congress apparently deferred responsibility to the real estate industry for establishing and maintaining the guidelines for conducting prepurchase inquiries. The current state of the industry comprises various publications by realtors, lawyers, financiers, environmental engineers, and consultants describing the require3. commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property;
4. the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the
property; and
5. the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
CERCLA § 101(35)(B).
134. See supra notes 113-115 and accompanying text.
135. The SARA conference committee report states that a purchaser should "exercise that degree of due care which is reasonable under the circumstances." H.R.
CONF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986).
136. See supra note 98.

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol9/iss1/6

30

CERCLA

1991]

ments of "environmental
37

audits"

for real estate

transactions.1

The "all appropriate inquiry" standard is subjective and
must be evaluated against good commercial practice as it existed "as of the time of acquisition.' ' 3 8 This task is difficult

for several reasons: 1) there are a wide variety of publications
recommending requirements for environmental audits for real
estate transactions, creating a large, sometimes conflicting
body of materials from which to extract a current standard;' 39
2) the recommended practices for environmental audits have
evolved rapidly over the last ten years as a response to growing public awareness of hazardous waste, thus making it difficult to pin down a standard as it existed at a particular point
in time;4 0 and 3) many properties and facilities have unique
137. See, e.g.,

PROCEEDINGS OF

1991

ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS CASE

STUDIES AND STRATEGIES: THE CONFERENCE (The Fawcett Center for Tomorrow, 1991);
THE AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR TESTING AND MATERIALS, DRAFT STANDARD GUIDE FOR

PHASE

I

ENVIRONMENTAL

PROPERTY ASSESSMENTS

(1991);

ENVIRONMENTAL

AUDITS

(Lawrence B. Cahill ed., 6th ed. 1989); Gary C. Ribblett & Kris H. Turschmid, Advice
From Environmental Consultants: How to Achieve Competent, Comprehensive and
Understandable Results from Environmental Audits, 41 S.C. L. REV. 887 (1990);
AMERICAN
HAZARDS:

ENVIRONMENTAL

A

GROUP,

SCREENING

REAL

PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR ATTORNEYS, LENDERS

ESTATE FOR

&

ENVIRONMENTAL

DEVELOPERS

(1989); ASFE/

THE ASSOCIATION OF ENGINEERING FIRMS PRACTICING IN THE GEOSCIENCES, PREACQUISITION SITE ASSESSMENTS

(1989);

CONSULTING

ENGINEERS COUNCIL OF METROPOLITAN

WASHINGTON INC., GUIDELINES ENVIRONMENTAL SITE ASSESSMENTS (1989); EPA, SELECTED CURRENT

PRACTICES

IN

PROPERTY

TRANSFER

ENVIRONMENTAL

ASSESSMENT

(Sept. 1989); Baker, Tainted Property: Hazardous Substances, Hazardous Waste
and Asbestos in Real Property Transactions,in THE SEVENTH ANNUAL SEMINAR ON
HAZARDOUS WASTE AND TOXIC TORTS: REGULATION-LIABILITY 119 (Lippes & Wrubel
Co-Chairpersons 1989); JOEL S. MOSKOWITZ, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY AND REAL
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE (1989) (detailed comprehensive audit
forms are included in Appendix D); STEVEN A. TASHER AT AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAWS
AND REAL ESTATE HANDBOOK, IV-8 to -9 (2d ed. 1988); Reich & Leifer, The Effect of

CERCLA on Property Transfers, in Miller & Bennet, Due Diligence Techniques for
the Innocent Landowner/Purchaser,3 Toxics L. Rep. (BNA) 434 (1988); RAYMOND
W. KANE, ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS IN REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS (1987); Elliott H.
Levitas & John V. Hughes, Hazardous Waste Issues in Real Estate Transactions,38

L. REV. 581 (1987).
138. HR. CONF.REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 187 (1986). "[Glood commer-

MERCER

cial or customary practice .. . shall mean that reasonable inquiry must have been
made in all circumstances, in light of best business and land transfer principles." Id.
139. See supra note 130.
140. The practice of conducting environmental audits for real estate transactions
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attributes, making it difficult to determine what procedures
may or may not have been appropriate at a particular site.
Even if a regulatory standard is promulgated to provide a
bench mark against which future inquiries may be weighed,
with regard to past transactions, courts still must determine
"good commercial or customary practice" as it existed at the
time of the transaction.
4.

"Good Commercial or Customary Practice" Today

With the volume of writings that have been produced to
date, a rather clear industry standard has emerged for conducting "all appropriate inquiry ...consistent with good commercial or customary practice. '1 4' The authorities generally
agree that a "phase I environmental audit" should be conducted by an environmental consultant or engineer, and
should include a visual review of the facility, a review of available documentation concerning the past use of the site, and a
review of government records to determine the site's environmental regulatory history."41
5.

Legislative Answers

While the phase I environmental audit industry has
evolved to a stage where a general standard exists, the current
lack of a regulatory standard leaves room for confusion and
could lead to unnecessary litigation. Lawmakers have responded to this confusion by proposing legislation to clarify
is a relatively recent development. See Frank J. Priznar, Trends in Environmental
Auditing [20 News and Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10,179 (May 1990).
Prior to 1986, most environmental publications discussed environmental audits
mainly in the context of inspections conducted under regulatory statutes, such as the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1982 &
Supp. IV 1986). See, e.g., J. GORDON ARBUCKLE ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW HANDBOOK

(7th ed. 1983);

ENVIRONMENTAL AUDITS

(Lawrence B. Cahill et al., ed., 3d ed.

1984); John M. DeMeester, Practical Guidelines for Due Diligence Environmental
Auditing [18 News and Analysis] Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 12,210 (June 1988).
141. A survey of environmental professionals, released in 1991, indicates that a
"professional standard of care already exists." David Stamps, In Search of Due Diligence, EI DIGEST, Sept. 1991, at 35. CERCLA "appropriate inquiries" are commonly
referred to as "phase I environmental audits" or "environmental site assessments."

142. See supra note 130.
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the CERCLA duties of a prospective real estate purchaser.
a.

Proposed Amendments to CERCLA

In 1989, Congressman Weldon introduced H.R. 2787, the
"Innocent Landowner Defense Amendment of 1989. " 143 The
bill proposed requirements for a "Phase I Environmental Audit," which if performed prior to a transaction would establish
a rebuttable presumption that the defendant conducted "all
appropriate inquiry" for the purposes of CERCLA section
101(35)(B). 1 " The Phase I requirements specified by H.R.
2787 are essentially in agreement with today's state-of-the-art
practices, and would have been useful in establishing a baseline set of requirements for property transfer environmental
audits.
Because H.R. 2787 was not passed, it can be argued that
rather than characterizing "good commercial practice" in
1989, Congress' disposition of the bill suggests a preference for
case-by-case standards as opposed to fixed requirements. As
such, the history of H.R. 2787 may complicate, rather than
resolve, future litigation.
Similar provisions were included in the "Superfund Liability Clarification Act" introduced by Congressman Owens in
1991.' 45 Like the LaFalce bill, the Superfund Liability Clarification Act would establish a rebuttable presumption of "all
143. H.R. 2787, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989).
144. H.R. 2787 proposed that the Phase I audit be conducted by an "environmental professional," defined as an attorney, engineer or consultant possessing appropriate academic training and reputation. The requirements of the Phase I audit contained in the bill include:
-a review of the chain of title going back 50 years;
-review of aerial photographs to determine prior use of the site;
-review of reasonably obtainable federal, state and local records regarding
hazardous waste activities on the site;
-a visual site inspection.
If the Phase I audit discloses the likely presence of hazardous substances, then
the presumption of the "appropriate inquiry" shall not arise unless the defendant has
taken reasonable steps in accordance with existing regulations and acceptable engineering practices to confirm the presence or absence of the threat. In other words,
Phase II testing must be performed if the Phase I inquiry finds the presence of contamination likely. Id.
145. H.R. 1643, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
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appropriate inquiry" for real estate purchasers who conduct a
"Phase I Environmental Audit." The bill would establish a
regulatory program in which the states would accredit "Certified Environmental Professionals" who perform audits, and it
would adopt a regulatory standard for conducting "Phase I
Environmental Audits."1" 6
b.

State Laws

Several states have enacted laws specifying disclosure
and/or investigation requirements prior to commercial real estate transactions." 7 While these laws may clearly establish a
purchaser's duties under a state "Superfund" law, it is far
from clear that compliance with these laws will satisfy CERCLA. The requirements under many state laws (the New
Jersey Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act (ECRA)
not included) are less rigorous than the current industry practices. In light of the narrow application of the section
107(b).(3) defense by the courts, it appears unlikely that the
limited duties established under most state laws would suffice
for purposes of establishing an "appropriate inquiry consistent with good commercial practice" for CERCLA purposes.
IV.

Conclusion

Although Congress intended CERCLA liability to be
strict, it provided narrow exceptions in certain situations. Unfortunately, these exceptions are vaguely defined in the statute, and judicial interpretations have tended to exacerbate,
rather than to clarify, the uncertainty surrounding the terms
of the defenses. As a result, the real estate community and its
associated industries have been operating in recent years in a
state of confusion under the ominous threat of CERCLA lia146. Id. H.R. 1643 would adopt the standard currently being developed by the
American Society for Testing and Materials as the regulatory standard for conducting
Phase I Environmental Audits. Id.
147. See, e.g., Responsible Property Transfer Law, (IND. CODE ANN.) § 13-7-22.51 to -22 (Burns 1990 & Supp. 1991); Environmental Cleanup Responsibility Act, (N.J.
STAT. ANN.) §§ 13:1k-6 to -14 (West Supp. 1991); (CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.) §§ 22a-134
to -134(d) (West Supp. 1991).
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bility. However, their complaints have not been ignored, and
current efforts to develop standards for real estate lenders and
purchasers should provide a measure of protection for those
willing to assert due diligence and act responsibly.
The uncertainty for lenders arises from the section
101(20)(A) secured creditor exemption and its use of the term
''management participation." The Ninth Circuit's standard of
actual participation, stated in the Bergsoe Metal1 48 decision,
is a workable standard which allows lenders to generally gauge
their status with regard to the exemption. However, the Eleventh Circuit's "capacity to influence" test, articulated in the
Fleet Factors149 decision, broadened the potential liability of
lenders to an unprecedented level. Under the Fleet Factors
standard, lenders must make a difficult decision in structuring
loan agreements: either to dissociate themselves from their
borrowers' operations such that they are unable to influence
management decisions, thus choosing a greater risk of default
rather than potential CERCLA liability; or to regulate and inspect their borrowers' operations, essentially becoming private
environmental protection agencies.
After several years of confusion, however, it appears that
some standards have, or are about to become, recognized. Proposed EPA regulations would codify the Bergsoe Metal interpretation that "management participation" under section
101(20)(A) requires actual participation. If promulgated, the
regulations should serve to limit government enforcement actions to situations in which a lender has actually influenced
hazardous waste management practices. In addition, the regulations should serve to guide the courts in private party CERCLA litigation involving secured creditors.
The uncertainty for real estate purchasers arises from the
section 107(b)(3) innocent landowner defense and its use of
the term "all appropriate inquiry." The statute itself provides
only general guidance as to the scope and depth of the inquiry
required. Federal regulations clarifying "all appropriate inquiry" have yet to be accepted, and the courts have applied
148. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
149. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
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varying interpretations as to the adequacy of particular investigations. As a result, a purchaser of an apparently uncontaminated site can not be certain of protecting himself from potential CERCLA liability, regardless of the diligence exercised
in investigating the property.
Although industry standards for environmental assessments (or "audits") have evolved into a recognized and somewhat uniform practice, the BCW Associates'"0 case illustrates
that a determination of the adequacy of a particular assessment requires consideration of the circumstances on a caseby-case basis. Because of the uniqueness of real estate and the
unlimited variety of activities that may have occurred on or
adjacent to a specific site in the past, environmental inspectors must exercise considerable discretion in performing assessments and arriving at their conclusions. Without clear
standards for conducting environmental assessments, it can be
argued that any investigation which fails to detect hidden
contamination may be insufficient to rise to the level of an
"appropriate inquiry."
Current practices in environmental auditing can be established by reviewing the numerous publications on the subject
by engineers, consultants, and lawyers. While proposed Congressional bills to incorporate these practices into law have
been unsuccessful, the development of the ASTM standard on
environmental assessment should provide a comprehensive
and widely recognized standard for conducting "all appropriate inquiry." "Innocent" purchasers and the courts should be
able to use these industry standards, as defined by ASTM, as
a decisionmaking tool in evaluating the adequacy of a particular environmental assessment and the degree of diligence required under the circumstances.
Amending CERCLA to provide broad exceptions for
lenders and purchasers would not be consistent with the statute's remedial purpose. In order to allow CERCLA's system of
strict liability to operate as intended without wreaking financial ruin on "innocent" parties, official standards for environ150. 3 Toxics L. Rep. 943 (BNA) (E.D. Pa 1988), available in LEXIS, Envtl.
Library.
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mental assessments and for lender management participation
are essential. Not only would such standards reduce future litigation attempting to resolve the undefined statutory phrases,
but they would also delineate the boundary within which "innocent" purchasers and responsible lenders could operate
without the unreasonable fear of CERCLA liability.
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